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Trust and Reciprocity:  
Implications of Game Triads and Social Contexts* 
 
By James C. Cox 
 
1. Introduction 
This paper explores a behavioral phenomenon that has not been included in models of social 
preferences: the effects of social context on trust, reciprocity, and altruism. An experiment is 
reported in which the social context varies from a “weak” (or one task) to a “strong” (or two task) 
social context. Use of the strong social context makes it possible to experiment with trust, 
reciprocity, and altruism in an environment in which there will be future play but no repeated 
game with the same person. This introduces into the experiment a feature of everyday life in large 
cities that contrasts with household and work environments. Much interaction in household and 
work environments involves repeated games with the same individuals, such as interactions 
among family members and co-workers, but much social interaction in large cities involves play 
of one shot games in rich social contexts with future interactions but without repeated games with 
the same individuals. Examples which illustrate the distinction are provided by informal 
observations of automobile and bus driver interactions. 
The experiment on effects of social context was motivated by the “social history” 
treatment in the investment game experiment reported by Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995). 
They report that informing subjects in the social history treatment about the choices made by 
others in a previous investment game (the “no history” treatment) causes first movers to send 
more money (to second movers) and second movers to return more money (to first movers). But 
the reasons why subjects respond to information provided in the social history treatment are not 
clear. Does the information suggest to subjects a more familiar, social context that calls forth 
more generous behavior than the spare, one shot game of the no history treatment? Do data on 
money returned by many second movers cause some first movers to become more trusting? Or do 
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the examples of generous behavior by others (first and second movers) cause some first movers to 
become more altruistic? Do data on money sent by many first movers cause some second movers 
to become more positively reciprocal? Or do the reports of generous behavior by others cause 
some second movers to become more altruistic? The experiment reported here investigates effects 
of social context directly, by varying the context from “weak” to “strong.”  
The weak social context implementation of the investment game is simply the standard 
investment game, which is a one shot game, run with a double blind payoff procedure for 
experimental subjects’ anonymity. The strong social context implementation of the investment 
game uses a design in which there is a second game, implemented with random subject 
reassignment, that follows the individual subject pair implementation of the investment game. 
The existence of the second game introduces a stronger social context but it does not introduce a 
repeated game, in the usual sense, because no one can acquire a reputation given the anonymity 
of double blind payoffs.  
The weak and strong social context treatments are implemented with the triadic 
experimental design for experiments with the investment game previously reported in Cox (2002, 
2004).  The triadic design makes it possible to discriminate between transfers resulting from trust 
or reciprocity towards specific individuals and transfers resulting from (unconditional) altruism. 
Data from triadic design experiments with the investment game (Cox, 2004) and the 
moonlighting game (Cox, Sadiraj, and Sadiraj, 2008) figure prominently in empirical support for 
new theories of conditional reciprocity (Cox, Friedman, and Gjerstad, 2007; Cox, Freidman, and 
Sadiraj, 2008). Data from the experiment reported here suggest that future models of trusting 
behavior may need to discriminate between one task and two (or N) task play even when there are 
no repeated games between the same players.  
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2. Some Observations on the Effects of Social Context 
The possible dependence of other-regarding behavior on the social context of the decision 
environment can be appreciated from considering informal observations of driving behavior in 
Arizona and England. Tucson and adjacent communities in Pima County, Arizona comprise a 
medium-size metropolitan area with population of about 850,000.  Because there is only one 
freeway on the edge of the city, much of the commuter traffic is carried by city streets. The heavy 
traffic produces frequent interactions between drivers in traffic lanes who own the (both legally 
and socially defined) right of way and other drivers wanting to enter the traffic lanes from side 
streets, parking lots, and driveways.  Each interaction between a pair of drivers, one with and the 
other without ownership of the lane right of way, is (for any practical purpose) a “one shot game” 
in the sense that the probability that this pair of drivers will ever encounter each other again is 
close to 0. Thus it is not possible to develop a personal reputation with any other individual 
driver. But these right of way games are played in a social context that has some observable 
implications. My observations of how people play these games are as follows. 
Many drivers refuse to let the other driver in during an individual encounter.  In a substantial 
minority of the encounters, the driver owning the right of way delays his or her trip to let the 
other driver into the traffic lane. In response, most but not all of the drivers receiving the courtesy 
wave and smile to convey their gratitude. But because of the social context of play, such an 
interaction between a pair of drivers is not always the end of the actions triggered by the courtesy 
of the original driver who gave the right of way to another.  In some cases, one can see the 
recipient of the original courtesy extend a similar one to a third party.  My personal experience as 
a participant is as follows.  If another driver extends me the courtesy of letting me into the street, 
the probability is essentially 1 that I will extend the same courtesy to the next driver I encounter 
on that trip.1  That such “second task” behavior can have implications for the first encounter 
between two paired drivers can be understood as follows.  Suppose that some drivers prefer that 
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other drivers be courteous.  Also suppose that some of the drivers with this preference anticipate 
that courtesy can be contagious. Then these drivers will have a greater motivation to extend the 
first courtesy themselves than they would if their interaction with a specific other driver were not 
embedded in a social context of numerous interactions between pairs of drivers. Thus the richness 
of the social context of play of the right of way game may be a significant determinant of 
behavior. 
Jim Engle-Warnick made some observations that supplement mine while riding a bus from 
Oxford to Heathrow Airport. He counted 12 courtesies extended by the bus driver to others, and 
six courtesies extended by others to the bus driver. There were eight (directly-reciprocal) waves 
of acknowledgement by recipients of courtesies and three (indirectly reciprocal) courtesies 
extended to third parties within the short period of time before the original recipients disappeared 
from view.  Upon being asked at the end of the trip why he was courteous to others on the road, 
the bus driver replied:  “Because other people will be more likely to do it.” The experiment 
reported in this paper poses the question of whether subjects in a stylized experiment exhibit 
behavior consistent with the bus driver’s explanation of his/her motivation. 
Further interpretations of the informal observations of driving behavior are as follows. A 
driver may incur a cost to extend a courtesy to another because of other-regarding preferences or 
because of an intention to promote indirect reciprocity in others. The individual receiving the 
courtesy may wave and smile to show positive reciprocity. Furthermore, a driver receiving a 
courtesy may be more likely to subsequently extend a similar courtesy to another, thus exhibiting 
indirect reciprocity. And, of course, there are examples of discourteous driving behavior with 
associated patterns of negatively reciprocal responses such as honking, cursing, etc. These 
interactions are not repeated games, in the usual sense, because the probability that the same pair 
of drivers will encounter each other more than once is close to 0 in a large urban environment. 
But the right of way games are played in a social context with the following salient characteristic: 
while extending a courtesy or responding to one, a driver knows that other interactions lie ahead 
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but does not know exactly what those interactions (or games) will turn out to be. The design of 
our rich social context experiment is intended to incorporate this salient characteristic of everyday 
social interaction into the laboratory in a simple stylized way by informing the subjects that there 
will be a subsequent task with possible (monetary) payoff but telling them nothing specific about 
that task.   
The experimental protocol explained in section 5 varies the environment from a weak to a 
strong social context. The experiment involves game triads, described in section 4, that include 
the investment game introduced by Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995) and later used by several 
other authors. 
 
3.  The Investment Game 
Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (hereafter BDMc) implemented the investment game by dividing 
the subjects into two groups, the room A group and the room B group.  Every subject was given 
an endowment of ten $1 bills. Room B subjects were instructed to keep their $10 endowments. 
Room A subjects were informed that they could keep all of their $10 endowments or transfer any 
integer amount to a paired subject in room B. Any amount transferred by a room A subject was 
multiplied by 3 by the experimenter before being delivered to a room B subject.  Subsequently, 
room B subjects were given the opportunity to return none, part, or all of the amount received to 
the paired subject in room A.  The experiments used a double-blind payoff protocol in which 
individual subjects’ responses were anonymous to both other subjects and the experimenter. 
 If one assumes there are no other-regarding preferences, then game theory predicts that: 
(i) room B subjects will keep all the money they receive because room B subjects prefer more (of 
their own) money to less; and (ii) knowing this, room A subjects (who care only about their own 
money) will not transfer any money.  This “completely-selfish” subgame perfect equilibrium 
leaves each pair of subjects with $20, whereas the pair could have ended up with as much as $40. 
Thus this allocation is Pareto inferior to some alternative feasible allocations. 
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 Results from investment game experiments reported by BDMc were that the average 
amount transferred by room A subjects was $5.16 and the average amount returned by room B 
subjects was $4.66. When data from this experiment were provided to subjects in a subsequent 
experiment (the “social history” treatment), the average amount transferred by room A subjects 
was $5.36 and the average amount returned was $6.46. There was large variability across subjects 
in both treatments of the amounts transferred and returned. 
Data from investment game experiments support the following interpretation.  A room A 
subject may be willing to transfer money to an unknown room B person if he or she trusts that 
some of the tripled amount transferred will be returned. Further, a room B subject may be willing 
to return part of the tripled amount transferred if he or she is motivated by positive reciprocity.  
But a room A subject may be willing to make a transfer to a paired subject in room B even if 
there is no opportunity for the latter to return anything.  Data from the investment game do not 
allow one to distinguish between first mover transfers resulting from trust and transfers resulting 
from altruistic other-regarding preferences. Similarly, investment game data do not discriminate 
between second mover transfers resulting from reciprocity and (unconditional) other-regarding 
preferences because a room B subject may be willing to transfer money to a paired subject in 
room A even if that paired subject did not give him/her any money. In order to make these 
distinctions, one needs a more elaborate experimental design. 
 
4. The Triadic Experimental Design 
The triadic experimental design involves three games incorporated into three related treatments.2 
Game A is the investment game.  Game B is a dictator game that differs from game A only in that 
the individuals in the “second-mover” group do not have a decision to make; thus they do not 
have an opportunity to return anything. Game C involves a decision task that differs from game A 
as follows. The “first movers” do not have a decision to make.  Each “second mover” is given a 
$10 endowment.  “First movers” are given endowments in amounts equal to the amounts kept 
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(i.e. not sent) by the first movers in game A.  Furthermore, the “second movers” in game C are 
given “additional dollar amounts” equal to the amounts received by second movers in game A 
from the tripled amounts sent by the first movers in game A.  The subjects are informed with a 
table of the exact inverse relation between the number of additional dollars received by a “second 
mover” and the endowment of the anonymously-paired “first mover.” Subjects are not informed 
that the amounts of first mover endowments and second mover additional dollar amounts were 
determined by subjects’ decisions in a preceding experiment session with game A.3 
Treatment B differs from treatment A only in that the “second movers” do not have a 
decision to make in treatment B. Since an individual “second mover” cannot return anything to 
the paired first mover” in treatment B, the first mover cannot be motivated by trust that the 
“second mover” will do so. Treatment C differs from treatment A only in that the “first movers” 
do not have a decision to make in treatment C. Since an individual “first mover” cannot send 
anything in treatment C, the paired “second mover” cannot be motivated by positive reciprocity 
towards the individual “first mover.”  
 
5.  Experiment Protocol 
Two experiments are reported that have different social contexts.  The experiment with a strong 
social context involves a second decision task that follows the first decision task in a treatment 
involving game A, B, or C.  The presence of the second task does not introduce a repeated game 
because subject anonymity and random matching make it impossible for any subject to acquire a 
reputation.  The experiment with a weak social context does not involve a second task. A 
summary of the experiment protocol is presented here.  The appendix contains a more detailed 
discussion of the protocol.  
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5.1 Strong Social Context  
The experiment involves three treatments. Treatment ASC implements game A, the investment 
game, in the strong social context. Treatments BSC and CSC implement games B and C, 
respectively, in the strong social context.  
The instructions for each treatment announce the existence of a second task but do not 
explain that it is a group decision task involving the investment game. The experiment sessions 
are run manually (i.e., not with computers). At the end of a session, a coin is flipped in the 
presence of the subjects to determine whether task one or task two has monetary payoff. Data for 
task one are reported in this paper.4 The payoff procedure is double blind: (a) subject responses 
are identified only by letters that are private information of the subjects; and (b) monetary payoffs 
are collected in private from sealed envelopes contained in lettered mailboxes.  
 
5.2 Weak Social Context 
This experiment includes treatments AWC, BWC, and CWC, the implementation of games A, B and 
C in a weak social context. The weak social context is one in which there is no second task. These 
data were previously reported in Cox (2004). Except for elimination of the second task, 
treatments AWC, BWC and CWC are the same, respectively, as treatments ASC, BSC and CSC.  
 
5.3  Excerpts from Subject Instructions 
This section presents some key paragraphs in the subject instructions for the two social contexts. 
Complete subject instructions for all six treatments are available on the author’s home page 
(http://expecon.gsu.edu/jccox/subjects.html). 
 The only difference between subject instructions for the strong social context and the 
weak social context consists of one paragraph.  Instructions for all three treatments in the strong 
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social context included the paragraph while instructions for all three treatments in the weak social 
context did not include the paragraph.  Here is the paragraph. 
A Two Part Experiment 
Today’s experiment has two parts, called Task One and Task Two.  One of these 
parts will be selected for money payoff, by flipping a coin, at the end of the 
experiment.  Task One decisions will be made in this room.  Task Two decisions 
will be made in other rooms, down the hallway. These are the instructions for Task 
One. 
 
Instructions for all six treatments contained two paragraphs that explained the double 
blind payoff procedures. These procedures are designed to make it impossible for a subject to 
acquire a reputation with any other subject or with the experimenter.  The purpose of using this 
double blind procedure in fairness games is to eliminate concerns the subjects might have about 
having their personal decisions known by the experimenters. Double blind protocols provide tests 
for the significance of internalized norms for reciprocity and fairness.5  In the present experiment 
in the strong social context, the double blind protocol has the additional purpose of controlling for 
repeated game effects between the same pair of subjects. All six treatments contained two 
paragraphs that explain the double blind payoff protocol.  Here are the two paragraphs. 
Anonymity  
Each person in Group X will be randomly paired with a person in Group Y.  No one 
will learn the identity of the person she/he is paired with. 
 
Complete Privacy 
This experiment is structured so that no one, including the experimenters, the 
monitor, and the other subjects will ever know the personal decision of anyone in the 
experiment.  This is accomplished by a procedure in which you collect your money 
payoff, contained in a sealed envelope, from a lettered mailbox that only you have 
the key for. Your privacy is guaranteed because neither your name nor your student 
ID number will appear on any form that records your decisions in this experiment.  
The only identifying mark on the decision forms will be a letter known only to you.  
You will be able to collect your money payoffs with privacy by using a key, which 
opens a mailbox.  The key and mailbox will be labeled with the same letter as your 
decision-reporting forms.  But you will be the only person who knows your personal 
letter.  
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6.  Comparison with the BDMc Data 
I first ask whether data from the strong social context and weak social context investment games 
look like data from the BDMc social history and no history investment games.6 Next, several 
significance tests are reported that compare data from the strong social context investment game 
with data from the social history investment game to ascertain whether these games involve 
similar behavior. 
 Table 1 reports means and standard deviations of amounts sent and returned in all four 
investment games.  Figures in the middle column reveal little difference among average amounts 
sent by first movers in all four implementations of the investment game.  In contrast, average 
amounts returned by second movers appear to fall into two categories: (a) relatively small 
amounts are returned in the weak social context and no history experiments; and (b) relatively 
large amounts are returned in the strong social context and social history experiments. This 
suggests that behavior in the strong social context and social history implementations of the 
investment game may be similar.  The tests reported in Table 2 make a more detailed comparison 
of these two treatments. 
Treatment ASC included 30 pairs of subjects run in two sessions.  Treatment SH included 
28 pairs of subjects run in three sessions. Both data sets exhibit large variability across subjects. 
The amount sent varies from 0 to 10 and the amount returned varies from 0 to 20 in the data for 
both experiments. There are some small differences between the two data sets.  As reported in the 
second and third columns of Table 2, on average the subjects in treatment ASC both sent a little 
more ($6.00 vs. $5.36) and returned a little more ($7.17 vs. $6.46) than the subjects in treatment 
SH.  On average, the sending (or first-mover) subjects in treatment ASC made a $1.17 profit and 
those in treatment SH made a $1.10 profit. Also, treatment SH data are noisier than treatment ASC 
data in that the former have higher standard deviations for amounts sent and returned. 
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The last row of Table 2 reports two-sample t-tests for differences of means and Smirnov 
tests comparing the empirical cumulative distributions of treatment ASC and treatment SH data.7 
The difference between mean amounts sent is not significantly different from 0 (p = 0.430) 
according to the two-tailed t-test. The maximum difference between the cumulative distributions 
of amounts sent in treatment ASC and treatment SH is not significant (p = 0.491) according to the 
two-tailed Smirnov test.  
The first and second rows in the right-most five columns of Table 2 report tobit estimates 
of the relation between amounts returned and amounts sent in treatment ASC and treatment SH.  
The estimated model is given by 
(1) ttt SR εβα ++= , 
 
where Rt  is the amount returned by the second mover in subject pair t and St  is the amount sent 
by the first mover in pair t.  The bounds for the tobit estimation are the bounds imposed by the 
feasible sets in the game: 
(2) . ]3,0[ tt SR ∈
One would expect that the cone created by these bounds might produce heteroskedastic errors.  In 
order to allow for the possibility of heteroskedastic errors, the tobit estimation procedure 
incorporates estimation of the parameter θ  in the following model of multiplicative 
heteroskedasticity: 
(3)  .tSt e
θσ σ=
 
The 0.055 estimate of the intercept for the treatment ASC data is not significantly different 
from 0 (p = 0.966).  The 1.17 slope coefficient for amount sent is significantly different from 0 (p 
= 0.000).  Because its standard error is 0.275, the slope coefficient for the treatment ASC data are 
also significantly different from 2 at a 1% significance level.  Thus, the subjects’ return behavior 
is significantly different from the prediction of completely-selfish subgame perfect equilibrium 
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( 0=β ) and the equal-split fairness focal point ( 2=β ).  Sending subjects did, on average, earn 
a profit on the amounts they sent, but  is not significantly different from 1, which is the 
prediction of the zero-loss (by first movers) fairness focal point. The 0.152 estimate of the 
parameter 
βˆ
θ  of the heteroskedasticity model is significant (p = 0.004).  The right-most column of 
Table 2 reports the results from a likelihood ratio test for significance of the fitted model.  It is 
highly significant (p = 0.000) for the treatment ASC data. 
The 0.275 estimate of the intercept for treatment SH data is not significantly different 
from 0 (p = 0.858). The 1.11 slope coefficient for treatment SH data is significantly different 
from 0 (p = 0.001) and significantly from 2 at 1% significance; hence the subjects’ return 
behavior is significantly different from the predictions for the completely-selfish subgame perfect 
equilibrium and the equal-split fairness focal point. Sending subjects did, on average, make a 
profit on the amounts they sent, but  is not significantly different from 1.  The 0.096 estimate 
of the parameter of the heteroskedasticity model is not significant (p = 0.160).  The result of the 
likelihood ratio test is significance (p = 0.000) for treatment SH data. 
βˆ
The last row of Table 2 reports tobit estimates of the model, 
(4) ttttt SDSR εγβα +++=  
 
where: 
(5) Dt  = 1 for treatment ASC data 
            =  0 for treatment SH data. 
This estimation uses the bounds and heteroskedasticticity model given by statements (2) and (3).  
The estimate of γ  is not significantly different from 0 (p = 0.897), which provides additional 
support for the conclusion that the differences between the data from treatment ASC and treatment 
SH are not significant.  
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7.  Effects of Social Contexts 
Table 1 reveals that first mover behavior in investment games in the strong and weak social 
contexts looks similar: the average amount sent in treatment ASC was $6.00 while the average 
amount sent in treatment AWC was $5.97. In contrast, second movers in the investment game 
returned more in the strong social context than in the weak social context: the average amount 
returned in treatment ASC was $7.17 while the average amount returned in treatment AWC was 
$4.77.  Data from the full triadic design yield insight into effects of social context on subjects’ 
revealed trust and reciprocity.  
 
7.1  Effects of Social Context on Individual Trust 
 
Data from treatments ASC and BSC can be used to test for the significance of trusting behavior in 
the strong social context.8 The first row of Table 3 reports the mean amounts sent by first movers 
in treatments ASC and BSC. The mean amount sent was slightly larger in treatment ASC than in 
treatment BSC but the difference is insignificant by a one-tailed means test (p = 0.389). The 
Smirnov test also reveals no significant difference between amounts sent in treatments ASC and 
BSC (p = 0.386). Thus there is no support in the data from the strong social context for the 
hypothesis that the first movers sent part of their endowments to the paired second movers 
because of a trust that the second movers would directly reciprocate to them. 
The second row of Table 3 reports that the mean amounts sent in treatments AWC and BWC 
were, respectively, $5.97 and $3.63.  The one-tailed t-test for difference in means is significant (p 
= 0.010).  The one-sided Smirnov test also reveals a significant difference between amounts sent 
in treatments AWC and BWC (p = 0.045). Thus the weak social context data support the conclusion 
that the first movers’ behavior was partly motivated by trust that the paired second movers would 
directly reciprocate to them. 
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7.2  Effects of Social Context on Individual Reciprocity 
Data from implementations of games A and C can be used to test for the significance of direct 
positive reciprocity as a motive for second movers’ behavior.  The first row of Table 4 reports 
mean amounts sent and returned in treatments ASC and CSC.  On average, the amount returned in 
treatment ASC exceeded the amount sent by $1.17.  The average amount returned in treatment CSC 
was $1.23 less than the amount “sent.”  The difference between the treatment ASC and treatment 
CSC outcomes is in the direction implied by positive reciprocity.  The one-tailed t-test implies that 
the mean amount returned in treatment ASC is significantly greater than the mean amount returned 
in treatment CSC (p = 0.017).   
The right-most five columns of the first row of Table 4 report tobit estimates of the 
parameters of the following relation between amounts sent and amounts returned in treatments 
ASC and CSC: 
(6) t t t tR S D S tα β γ= + + +ε , 
where 
(7) Dt  = 1 for treatment ASC data 
            =  0 for treatment CSC data. 
This estimation uses the bounds and heteroskedasticity model given by statements (2) and (3).  
Note that ?γ  is the estimate of the effect of (direct) reciprocity on amount returned by second 
movers to first movers. We observe that ?γ  is positive and significantly greater than 0 (p = 
0.002). Thus the data provide support for behavior involving positive reciprocity in a strong 
social context. 
The second row of Table 4 reports meant amounts sent and returned in treatments AWC and 
CWC.  On average, the amount returned by second movers in treatment AWC was less than the 
amount sent by $1.03.  The average amount returned in treatment CWC was $3.91 less than the 
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amount “sent.”  The difference between the treatment AWC and treatment CWC outcomes is in the 
direction implied by positive reciprocity.  A two-sample t-test for difference in means implies that 
the mean amount returned in treatment AWC is significantly greater than the mean amount 
returned in treatment CWC (p = 0.018).   
The right-most five of the second row of Table 4 reports tobit estimates of the parameters of 
the model given by statements (2), (3), (6), and  
(8) Dt  = 1 for treatment AWC data 
            =  0 for treatment CWC data. 
The estimate ?γ  is significantly greater than 0 (p = 0.034).  Hence the data provide support for 
behavior involving positive reciprocity in a weak social context. 
 
7.3  Effects of Social Context on Behavior in Investment and Dictator Games 
Data on average amounts sent and returned in Tables 3 and 4 suggest that the different effects of 
social context on individual-subject-pair trust and reciprocity come from the absence of an effect 
of social context on play of first movers in the investment game. Tests reported in Table 5 make 
this clear. The top row reports t-statistics and p-values for one-sided means tests of the hypothesis 
that amounts sent and returned are larger in the strong social context. The second row reports D-
statistics and p-values for one-sided Smirnov tests. 
Both the means test and Smirnov test reveal no significant difference between amounts 
`sent by first movers in the strong (treatment ASC) and weak (treatment AWC) social contexts.  In 
contrast, the strong social context causes significant increases in all other types of responses.  
Amounts sent in the first mover dictator control game are significantly larger in the strong social 
context (treatment BSC) than in the weak social context (treatment BWC).  In the investment game, 
second movers return significantly more in the strong social context (treatment ASC) than in the 
weak social context (treatment CSC).  Finally, amounts “returned” in the second mover dictator 
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control game are significantly larger in the strong social context (treatment CSC) than in the weak 
social context (treatment CWC). 
 
8.  Concluding Remarks 
This paper reports experiments with game triads that include the investment game. Researchers 
had previously established the replicable result that the majority of first movers send positive 
amounts and the majority of second movers return positive amounts in investment game 
experiments. This pattern of results, and results from many other non-market fairness 
experiments, are inconsistent with the predictions of the homo economicus model. Data from 
triadic design experiments and several other types of experiments provide support for models of 
conditional reciprocity (Cox, Friedman, and Gjersdtad, 2007; Cox, Friedman, and Sadiraj, 2008).  
In this paper the game triads are implemented in two different environments referred to as 
the strong and weak social contexts. Use of the strong social context makes it possible to conduct 
an experiment in an idealized environment that resembles the environment of ongoing social 
interaction that exists outside the laboratory in non-repeated game contexts.  In the strong social 
context, the subjects are informed at the beginning of an experiment session that there will be a 
second decision task after completion of the investment game or one of its dictator control games. 
They are further informed that only one of the decision tasks will be randomly selected for money 
payoff. Because of anonymity and random pairing the existence of the second task does not create 
a repeated game between individual subjects. The existence of the second task creates a richer 
social context than exists in the single-task fairness game experiments that typify much of the 
social preferences literature. The reasons for experimenting with the strong social context are 
illustrated by the naturally-occurring interaction between drivers on big city roads. The 
experiment environment without the second task is referred to as the weak social context.    
There has been one previous experiment aimed at investigating the implications of 
varying the social context.  In the first investment game experiment, Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe 
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(1995) implemented both a no history treatment and a social history treatment in which the 
subjects were given the data from a preceding no history treatment.  The social history treatment 
is a stronger social context than the no history treatment. Data from my investment game 
treatment in the strong social context closely resemble data from the Berg, et al. social history 
treatment.  
 As reported elsewhere (Cox, 2004) data from the experiment treatment with the weak 
social context provide evidence of positive reciprocity and trust, as well as unconditional 
altruism, between anonymously-paired individual subjects. Data from treatments with strong and 
weak social contexts reveal some notable effects from varying the social context. The mean 
amounts sent and “returned” are higher in both the first mover dictator control treatment and the 
second mover dictator control treatment in the strong social context than in the weak social 
context. The mean amount returned by second movers in the investment game is higher in the 
strong social context than in the weak context. The mean amount sent by first movers in the 
investment game is not higher in the strong social context than in the weak context. Thus the 
stronger social context elicits more generous behavior by both “first mover” and “second mover” 
dictators and by second movers in the investment game but not by first movers in the investment 
game. Comparisons between treatments in the weak social context support the conclusion that 
anonymously paired subjects exhibit both trust and reciprocity towards specific individuals. In 
contrast, comparisons between treatments within the strong social context support the conclusion 
that anonymously paired subjects exhibit positive reciprocity but do not exhibit trust towards 
specific paired individuals.   
 The more generous behavior by dictators and by second movers in the investment game 
in the strong social context is consistent with the opinion expressed by the Heathrow bus driver, 
that in a social context of repeated one shot games individuals may behave more generously 
“Because (…they believe…) other people will be more likely to do it.” The different, puzzling 
result is that introduction of the strong social context did not change behavior of first movers in 
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the investment game. Indeed, as shown by Table 1, first mover behavior in the investment game 
is remarkably invariant to changes in design and protocol across four different implementations 
of the game. But first mover behavior in dictator controls for the investment game changes 
significantly with the social context. This suggests that future models of trusting behavior may 
need to incorporate a distinction between one task play and two (or N) task play, even in the 
absence of repeated games. 
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Endnotes 
* Helpful comments and suggestions were received from the editors and two anonymous referees.  
Financial support was provided by the National Science Foundation (grants DUE-0622534 and 
IIS-0630805). 
 
1. This is not an example of the type of “indirect reciprocity” modeled in Nowak and Sigmund 
(1998a, 1998b).  In their model of repeated play, agents are rewarded for having a reputation for 
generous behavior and penalized for having a reputation for ungenerous behavior.  In contrast, in 
the driving example behavior does not appear to be rewarding or punishing individuals because of 
their personal reputations. 
 
2. The triadic design for the investment game, and the way it decomposes trust, reciprocity, and 
altruism, are explained in more detail in Cox (2004). Methodological issues concerning the triadic 
design and across-subjects, double-blind protocols are discussed in Cox, Sadiraj, and Sadiraj 
(2008).  
 
3. This design feature means that there is no “social history” in the way there is in the Berg, et al. 
(1995) experiment.  
 
4. The group decision making data from the second task are reported in Cox (2002), as are gender 
effects. 
 
5. Single blind and double blind payoff protocols have been shown to produce different behavior 
in fairness games (Hoffman, et al., 1994; Hoffman, McCabe, and Smith, 1995; Cox and Deck, 
2005, 2006; Cox, Sadiraj, and Sadiraj, 2008). 
 
6. As noted above, Berg, Dickhaut, and McCabe (1995) used a double blind payoff protocol.   
 
7. Conover (1980) explains the Smirnov test (pgs. 368-373) for comparing two empirical 
distributions and the Kolmogorov test (pgs.346-356) for comparing an empirical distribution with 
a theoretical distribution. The Smirnov test is reported here. Both types of tests are sometimes 
referred to as “Kolmogorov-Smirnov” tests. 
 
8. The tests reported in Table 3 do not use data for four of the subjects in sessions with treatment 
BSC. Questionnaire responses revealed that three subjects were confused.  Data for these three 
subjects (identified by their payoff key codes) are not used. One other subject was a repeat 
participant. The payoff key number of this subject was identified after the end of the experiment 
and the data are not used. 
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      Table 1.  Amounts Sent and Returned in Investment Games 
 
 
Treatment Sent Mean 
[St. Dev.] 
Returned Mean 
[St. Dev.] 
AWC  5.97 
[3.87] 
4.77 
[6.63] 
ASC 6.00 
[2.59] 
7.17 
[4.82] 
NH 5.16 
[2.94] 
4.66 
[5.55] 
SH 5.36 
[3.53] 
6.46 
[6.19] 
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Table 2.  Comparison of Treatment ASC and BDMc Treatment SH 
 
Data Sent 
Mean 
Ret. 
Mean 
Sent 
Means 
Test 
Sent 
Smirnov 
Test  
 
αˆ  
 
βˆ  
 
γˆ  
 
θˆ  
 
LR  
Test 
Tr. ASC 6.00 
[2.59] 
7.17 
[4.82] 
….. ….. .055 
(.966) 
1.17 
(.000) 
….. .152 
(.004) 
25.1 
(.000) 
Tr. SH 5.36 
[3.53] 
6.46 
[6.19] 
  .275 
(.858) 
1.11 
(.001) 
….. .096 
(.160) 
27.1 
(.000) 
Tr. ASC vs. 
Tr. SH  
….. ….. .795 
(.430) 
.219 
(.491) 
.163 
(.861) 
1.13 
(.000) 
.026 
(.897) 
.124 
(.003) 
53.6 
(.000) 
   p-values in parentheses. 
   Standard deviations in brackets. 
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Table 3.  Effects of Social Context on Individual Trust 
 
Social 
Context 
Tr. A  
Mean Sent 
Tr. B 
Mean Sent 
Tr. A vs. Tr. B 
Means Test 
Tr. A vs. Tr. B 
Smirnov Test 
Strong 6.00 
{30} 
5.81 
{38} 
.283 
(.389)1 
.168 
(.386)1 
Weak 5.97 
{32} 
3.63 
{30} 
2.38 
(.010)1 
.317 
(.045)1 
p-values in parentheses. 
1 denotes a one-tailed test. 
Standard deviations in brackets. 
Number of subjects in braces. 
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Table 4.  Effects of Social Context on Individual Reciprocity 
 
Social 
Context 
Mean  
Sent 
 
Tr. A 
Mean Ret. 
    Tr. C 
Mean Ret.
Tr. A vs. Tr. C 
Means Test 
 
αˆ  
 
βˆ  
 
γˆ  
 
θˆ  
 
LR  
Test 
Strong 6.00 
{30} 
7.17 
{30} 
4.77 
{30} 
1.58 
(.059) 1 
 
-.002 
(.998) 
.748 
(.000) 
.427 
(.002)1 
.181 
(.000) 
23.0 
(< .005) 
Weak 5.97 
{32} 
4.94 
{32} 
2.06 
{32} 
2.14 
(.018) 1 
4.20 
(.060) 
 
-.759 
(.124) 
.680 
(.034)1 
.158 
(.008) 
5.98 
(<.025) 
    p-values in parentheses. 
    1 denotes a one-tailed test. 
Number of subjects in braces. 
 
 
 25
 
 
Table 5.  Effects of Social Context in Investment and Dictator Games 
 
Test Amounts Sent Amounts Returned 
 ASC vs. AWC BSC vs. BWC ASC vs. AWC CSC vs. CWC 
Means .037 
(.515)1 
2.73 
(.004)1 
1.51 
(.069)1 
2.64 
(.005)1 
Smirnov .154 
(.479)1 
.467 
(.001)1 
.369 
(.015)1 
.421 
(.004) 
p-values in parentheses. 
1 denotes a one-tailed test. 
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Appendix.  Detailed Experiment Procedures 
 
 
A.1. The Strong Social Context 
 
The subjects first assembled in the sign-in room of the Economic Science Laboratory and 
recorded their names, student identification numbers, and signatures on a form.  Then a monitor 
was chosen randomly from the subject sample (by drawing a ball from a bingo cage) and given 
the responsibility of ensuring that the experimenters followed the procedures contained in the 
subject instructions for calculating money payoffs.  The monitor was paid $20 for this job.  The 
other subjects were not informed of the amount of this payment in order to avoid the possible 
creation of a focal earnings figure.  Next the subjects were randomly divided into two equal-size 
groups, Group X and Group Y and escorted into the large room of the Economic Science 
Laboratory.  The procedures differed somewhat across the three treatments because of the 
properties of the experiment design.  I will first explain in detail the procedures used in treatment 
ASC and, subsequently, explain how procedures differed in treatments BSC and CSC.  
Treatment ASC involves the investment game.  In a treatment ASC session, the Group X 
subjects were seated at widely-separated computer terminals with privacy side and front 
partitions.  (The computers were not used.)  The Group Y subjects were standing at the back of 
the room at the beginning of the session with treatment ASC.  Each Group Y subject was given an 
envelope labeled “my show-up fee” that contained ten task one $1 certificates.  Each subject and 
the monitor were given copies of the instructions for “task one” (the individual decision task).  
Then an experimenter read aloud the instructions.  After the reading of the instructions was 
completed, the Group Y subjects were escorted back to the sign-in room by one of the 
experimenters.  (The Group X subjects had no further contact with the Group Y subjects until 
after all decisions in both decision tasks had been completed.)  Then the Group X subjects were 
given the opportunity to raise their hands if they had questions.  If a subject raised his hand, he 
was approached by an experimenter and given an opportunity to ask questions and receive 
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answers in a low voice that could not be overheard by other subjects.  When there were no more 
questions, the experimenter left the room and the monitor took over to conduct the first mover 
individual decision task with the Group X subjects. 
The monitor carried a large box that contained smaller boxes equal in number to the 
number of subjects.  Each subject was given the opportunity to point to any remaining small box 
to indicate she wanted that one.  (The boxes all looked the same to the experimenters.)  A subject 
opened her box to find an envelope labeled “my show-up fee” that contained ten task one $1 
certificates.  The box also contained an empty envelope labeled “certificates sent to a paired 
person in Group Y” and an envelope containing a lettered task one mailbox key.  Finally, the box 
contained a one-page form that summarized the nature of the first-mover individual decision task. 
This form and the corresponding forms for other treatments are contained in an appendix 
available upon request.  All envelopes in the box were labeled with the letter on the mailbox key. 
Subjects were given 10 minutes to complete this task.  When a subject was finished, he 
put all of the envelopes except the key envelope back in the box and summoned the monitor to 
collect the box.  The monitor then carried the large box full of small boxes into another room for 
data recording and the preparation of boxes for the Group Y, second-mover subjects.  The 
monitor witnessed all data recording and Group Y box preparations.  
While the boxes were being processed, one experimenter escorted the Group X subjects 
out a side door of the Economic Science Laboratory and down the hall to the breakout rooms of 
the Decision Behavior Laboratory.  Next, another experimenter escorted the Group Y subjects 
into the Economic Science Laboratory to get ready for their second-mover decisions in the 
individual decision task.   
The Group Y subjects were given boxes by the monitor.  Each box contained an envelope 
with a lettered task one mailbox key.  The box contained two empty envelopes, one labeled “my 
certificates” and the other labeled “certificates returned to the paired person in Group X.”  The 
box contained the tripled number of certificates sent by the paired person in Group X and a form 
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summarizing the decision task. The form is contained in an appendix available upon request.  The 
Group Y subjects had to decide how many of the certificates to put in the envelopes labeled “my 
certificates” and “certificates returned to the paired person in Group X.” The Group Y subjects 
were given 10 minutes to complete the task.  When a subject was finished, she put all envelopes 
except the key envelope back in the box and summoned the monitor to collect it.  The monitor 
then carried the large box of little boxes to another room and watched the data recording 
The second-mover decisions in task one were conducted simultaneously with the first-
mover decisions in task two.  The first-mover decisions in task two were made by three-person 
committees that were formed by the experimenter by the order in which the subjects entered the 
laboratory from the hallway.  Thus, the first three subjects were assigned to be in the first 
committee, the next three in the second committee, and so on.  Each committee was seated in its 
own small breakout room.  Each member of each committee was given the written subject 
instructions for task two. Then an experimenter read aloud the instructions while all breakout 
room doors remained open.  Subjects were then given the opportunity to indicate whether they 
had any questions.  If there was a question, the experimenter entered the appropriate breakout 
room and closed the door before the question was asked and answered.  When there were no more 
questions, the experimenter left and the monitor took over.  The monitor permitted the members 
of each committee to point to a small box contained in a large box to indicate which remaining 
box the committee wanted.   A committee’s box contained an envelope labeled “our show-up fee” 
that contained 30 task two $1 certificates.  The box also contained an envelope labeled 
“certificates sent to a paired committee in Group Y” and an envelope containing a lettered task 
two mailbox key.  Finally, the box contained a one-page summary of the group decision task.  
The form is contained in an appendix available upon request.  The committees were given 20 
minutes to complete their tasks.  When a committee was finished, it put all envelopes except the 
key envelope back in the box and summoned the monitor by opening the door to its breakout 
room.  The monitor carried the large box full of little boxes to the processing room and watched 
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the data recording and preparation of boxes for the Group Y committees.  Next, an experimenter 
escorted the Group X subjects back to the sign-in room.   After all of the Group X subjects were 
in the sign-in room and the door was closed, an experimenter escorted the Group Y subjects out a 
side door of the Economic Science Laboratory and down the hallway to the breakout rooms of the 
Decision Behavior Laboratory.   
The Group Y subjects then made their task two, second-mover decisions.  Each Group Y 
committee was given an envelope labeled “our show-up fee” that contained 30 task two $1 
certificates.  The procedures for reading instructions, answering questions, and the role of the 
monitor were like those for the first-mover, Group X subjects.  Each Group Y committee’s box 
contained the tripled number of certificates sent to it by the paired committee in Group X.  The 
box also contained an envelope with a task two key, a summary instruction form, and two empty 
envelopes.  The empty envelopes were labeled  “our certificates” and “certificates returned to the 
paired committee in Group X.” 
     After the Group Y committees finished their task two decisions, they were escorted 
back down the hall to rejoin the Group X subjects in the Economic Science Laboratory.  Next, an 
experimenter flipped a coin in the presence of all of the subjects and the monitor.  The monitor 
announced whether the coin came up heads or tails.  If heads (tails) then each task one (Two) $1 
certificate was exchanged for one United States dollar.  While the subjects’ money payoffs were 
calculated, they filled out the questionnaires. In addition to the salient money payoff, each subject 
was paid $5 upon depositing her completed questionnaire in a box.  After the questionnaires were 
completed  the Group X subjects went together to obtain sealed envelopes containing their money 
payoffs from lettered mailboxes.  They had been asked to exit the building after obtaining their 
envelopes and not to open their envelopes until out of the building.  After the Group X subjects 
had left, the Group Y subjects obtained their payoff envelopes from the lettered mailboxes. 
The procedures for treatment BSC differed as follows from the treatment ASC procedures 
explained above.  The Group Y subjects did not make a decision in task one.  The procedures for 
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treatment CSC differed as follows from those for treatment ASC.  At the beginning of task one, the 
Group Y subjects were seated in the Economic Science Laboratory and the Group X subjects 
were standing at the back.  The Group X subjects did not make a decision in task one.  
 
A.2. The Weak Social Context 
Treatments BWC  and CWC  were conducted in the same way, respectively, as treatments BSC and 
CSC except there was no task two. 
